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That Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are critical to the infrastructure of modern society and vulnerable to various attacks has been understood for several years. This report provides a brief overview of the technologies that compose SCADA systems, the impacts when SCADA systems fail, a high-level overview of the vulnerabilities present in SCADA systems, and a review of efforts that have been made to mitigate these vulnerabilities to include configuration guides, vulnerability assessments, network intrusion detection, cryptography, and test beds.
SCADA, vulnerability, impact, countermeasures, configuration, assessment, network intrusion detection
21
Sidney C Smith 410-278-6235 Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU
Introduction
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems collect information from sensors and actuators about some physical environment and provide an operator interface which allows control and reporting. The physical environment could be a power plant, power-distribution network, water-treatment plant, manufacturing floor, petroleum refinery, or any other physical environment that requires control and data acquisition. As early as 1999 the European Organization for Nuclear Research was looking into using a SCADA system to control a laboratory environment. 1 As late as 2009 Aydogmus and Aydogmus discussed the use of a SCADA system to allow students to remotely interact with a laboratory supporting distance learning. 2 The data acquired may be operationally oriented and used to better run the system, or it could be strategic in nature and used to better run the company.
SCADA systems play a critical role in the foundation of modern society, and there is a large body of work dedicated to defending these systems from cyber attack. The purpose of this report is to survey and summerize that work. In Section 2, this report reviews the basic components of a SCADA architecture. In Section 3, it reviews the impacts of some famous failures in SCADA systems. In Section 4, this report discusses the shared and unique vulnerabilities of SCADA systems. In Section 5, it reviews the countermeasures that are currently in place to protect SCADA systems. In Section 6, the report provides some concluding insight into the current research being done to defend SCADA systems.
SCADA Architecture
Technically the SCADA system is composed of the information technology (IT) that provides the human-machine interface (HMI) and stores and analyzes the data. It may contain the logic necessary to operate the physical environment either autonomously or semi-autonomously. the often proprietary protocols and media used by the sensor network to the general purpose computer system that runs the SCADA system. IEDs are very small, dedicated computer systems that directly connect to and control sensors and actuators. MTUs connect to multiple RTUs, consolidating the control and data traffic from the RTUs to the SCADA system. MCCs are dedicated computer systems that control the performance of an electric motor. PLCs provide a more direct interface between the sensor or actuator to the SCADA system encompassing the functionality of the IED and RTU into one device. An RTU connects to one or more IEDs and consolidates their data collection and control providing a gateway between the IED and the SCADA system or MTU.
The figure illustrates a typical SCADA architecture. Notice that the IEDs and PLCs connect directly to the sensors and actuators which are not shown in this diagram. The IEDs are connected to RTUs or an FEP, called a port server/comm processor in the diagram. These are then connected to the SCADA system which consists of a communications server, historian, and application server and services several workstations running the HMI.
Early SCADA implementations tended to be proprietary main-frame systems connected to a network of PLCs, IEDs, and MTUs, etc., with dedicated serial lines using proprietary protocols that were isolated from the corporate network. In the early 1990s this was shifting to an open systems and client server architecture on Reduced Instruction Set Computing (RISC) platforms running some version of UNIX. 4 Around the turn of the millennium work began on applying Web technologies to SCADA systems. [5] [6] [7] [8] Lately the trend has been to move from the UNIX/RISC system to commodity hardware and Microsoft solutions although there is some Linux, 1 to move from dedicated serial lines to Ethernet and even Wireless technologies, to move from proprietary protocols to standard protocols, and to connect these systems to the corporate network. 9 The
proprietary HMIs have given way to Web-based applications. The requirement to share this information with customers and partners has spawned the implementation of Web-service-based applications. These migrations have greatly reduced the cost and increased the reliability and functionality of SCADA systems; however, they have also dramatically increased the risks inherent in them.
Impact of the Failure of SCADA Systems
SCADA systems control segments of the infrastructure critical to the smooth function of our society. These segments include the production and distribution of electricity, the distribution of water, the treatment of sewage, the refinement and distribution of petroleum-just to name a few. 10 Fernandez and Fernandez 11 provide the following survey of the impact of SCADA failures that lead to 4 major blackouts in 2003:
Outage 1: On August 25, 2003, more than 100 electric plants were shut down, including 22 nuclear power plants, affecting 50 million people in the U.S. and Canada. This was the biggest blackout in North American history, forcing the closure of 10 major airports, causing the cancellation of 700 flights, and leaving 350,000 people stranded on the New York City subway. A broken alarm at First Energy, a northern Ohio utility company, may have allowed too much to go wrong before technicians noticed the problem. The reversal of power happened so fast that operators did not have time to react, and within about 10 seconds, vast sections of the grid were overwhelmed. The failed lines in Ohio started a cascade that crashed several systems, despite a structure built for this type of defense.
Outage 2: On August 29, 2003, a failure of England's National Electric Grid caused a blackout in Central and Southern London affecting more than 250,000 people, 270 sets of traffic lights, and 1,800 trains. According to the latest findings, there was a fault in the volt system that apparently had not been properly maintained.
Outage 3: On September 23, 2003, Eastern Denmark and Southern Sweden experienced their worst blackout in 20 years. As maintenance issues have been raised, both of these outages have thus far been attributed to equipment failure.
Outage 4: On September 28, 2003, a power failure left most of Italy without power for several hours interrupting rail and air traffic and jamming emergency phone lines. Thousands were forced to take refuge in Rome's subways. As investigations revealed more information, it was found that the Italian response was either lacking, or too slow, and that Italian operators had made a wrong decision when coping with the interruption from Switzerland and France. Consequently, a cascade of power line outages resulted within Italy, and along its border.
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In 2011 Langer reported on a piece of malicious code that seems to target SCADA systems and the PLCs that they control. 12 This malicious code would come to be known as Stuxnet. Stuxnet was different from most other worms in that it appears to have limited its distribution to a targeted environment. It was initially introduced via a Universal Serial Bus (USB) device, and exploited four zero-day vulnerabilities in Microsoft Operations Systems to propagate itself throughout the SCADA system. It appears to have been looking for the systems used to download logic into particular Seimens PLCs. Once it verified that the PLCs were running the correct version of software, it would replace that software with its own malicious version. It appears that the intent of this code was to cause centrifuges in an uranium-enrichment facility to break down. Chen and Abu-Nimeh report, "The site's production dropped 15 percent in 2009, around the time Stuxnet is believed to have begun spreading." 
SCADA Vulnerabilities
SCADA systems share some common vulnerabilities in addition to some vulnerabilities that are quite unique. Modern SCADA systems are implemented on Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) hardware and software solutions; therefore, they inherit all of the vulnerabilities associated with these systems. 11 Remember Stuxnet used zero-day vulnerabilities in the Microsoft operating system to gain access to the PLCs where it installed its payload. More and more SCADA systems are using COTS networking technologies to include Ethernet and wireless networking, and they inherit all of the vulnerabilities inherent in them. 
SCADA Countermeasures
The fact that SCADA systems are very important and vulnerable has been understood, 15 and a significant body of work has been done to address these vulnerabilities. Many researchers and standards bodies have written configuration guides for SCADA systems. There are several researchers working vulnerability-assessment techniques. Work has been done in almost every area of intrusion detection. Research is being conducted in the use of cryptography and key management. Several people have created test beds for research into SCADA systems.
Configuration Guides
In There are limits to the effectiveness of configuration guides. If they are too complicated or expensive to implement, they will often be ignored unless some regulatory pressure exists to enforce them. In the IT field, configuration guides seem to suffer from a rapidly moving target. By the time a configuration guide can be written, tested, vetted, and approved the Operating System vendor has already released the next version requiring the configuration guide to be rewritten, tested, vetted, and approved. It is not at all unusual for systems in tightly regulated areas to be at least a version behind what is being currently offered. This means that brand new systems are being purchased with an operating system that is at least one version behind the latest. Given a life cycle of 3 to 5 years, organizations are often racing to upgrade before their systems reach their end of life. These configuration guides are often publicly available in order to ensure that the people who need them can get them; however, that means that we must assume that the adversary has them as well.
Vulnerability Assessments
Some very interesting work has been done to try to quantify the vulnerability of SCADA systems. In 2004 Eric Byres et al., used attack trees to analyze the vulnerabilities in the MODBUS/TCP SCADA protocol. 19 This work has direct application to protocol design and may make the next generation of protocols more secure. In 2006 Miles McQueen et al., used a directed compromise graph to determine the impact measured in time-to-compromise of security measures on a small SCADA system. He found an 86% reduction in vulnerabilities could yielded a 30% increase in time-to-compromise. 20 In 2007 Chee-Wooi Ten et al., proposed using attack trees to provide a quantitative vulnerability assessment of a power plant's SCADA system. 21 In 2008 he refined this approach; however, his models do not include OS Vulnerabilities. 22 All of these efforts are interesting proofs of concepts; however, their focus is so small as to bring into doubt whether their results would scale to real-world systems.
Network Intrusion Detection
There are basically 2 camps in network-intrusion detection: systems based upon signature detection and systems based upon anomaly detection. The signature-based systems look for traffic known to be malicious. The most popular and effective system deployed to protect networks today are signature-based. Signature based can be very efficient and provide a low false-positive rate; however, they lack the ability to detect zero-day attacks. In other words, they are always behind the adversary because the signature cannot be written until someone has already been exploited. Anomaly-detection systems work by learning what normal or benign traffic is and reporting on any abnormal traffic. These systems have the potential to detect zero-day exploits; however, it turns out that the complexity of modern networks makes discovering what normal or benign traffic is a very difficult problem. Historically these systems generate a significant number of false-positive alerts.
In the anomaly-detection camp are Steven Cheung et al., who in 2007 proposed using model-based intrusion detection specifically for SCADA networks that use MODBUS/TCP, 23 and Wei Gao et al., who in 2010 proposed using a neural-network-based, intrusion-detection system. 24 Cheung and Gao both assumed that the greater simplicity of SCADA systems and networks would allow them to get an accurate enough picture of normal or benign traffic that the number of false positives would be acceptable. They were able to present a proof of concept; however, their research was so tightly focused that it is not clear that their results would scale to real-world systems. Cheung focused upon one communication protocol out of the many that are in use in SCADA environments. Gao focused on only one attack vector out of the many that exist.
In 2007 Paul Oman and Matthew Phillips explored intrusion detection based upon pattern recognition. 15 Oman's system was more traditional signature-based with an anomaly-detection twist. He did do some very interesting work in the automated creation of his signatures. He was able to describe the correct operation of various devices and write rules that would fire if the traffic didn't match that pattern. The greatest limitation here is that rules would have to be written for every device in a SCADA network. This would be a very daunting task for any organization that had a primary mission other than research. It is this author's opinion that the only way this might be able to scale would be if vendors provided rule sets with their systems.
Cryptography
SCADA systems have the same authentication and confidentiality issues that are often addressed in other computer systems using cryptography. Encrypting the traffic should protect its confidentiality. The long life cycle of this equipment presents a further challenge. A new protocol invented today may take 15 to 20 years to fully deploy. Additionally the strength of cryptography relies on certain problems being computationally infeasible. Moore's Law implies that what is computationally infeasible today will be feasible tomorrow. For example the Data Encyption Standard (DES) had a 56-bit key. When DES was developed, it was computationally infeasible to attempt every 56-bit combination to decode a message. Today brute-forcing a 56-bit DES key can be done very quickly. Given a 15-to 20-year life cycle, it is possible that the infeasibility assumptions will be invalid before the system is fully deployed.
Test Beds
Since most production SCADA systems are too valuable to use for research and most research organizations cannot afford to stand up a SCADA system, there has been a significant amount of work in creating SCADA test beds. Oman was able to use the University of Idaho's Electrical Engineering Power Laboratory, "a fully functioning high-voltage facility." 15 In 2008 Annarita Giani et al., described the SCADA test bed that they built to test DoS, Integrity, and phishing attacks. 27 In 2011 Thomas Morris et al.,
described the Mississippi State University SCADA security laboratory. 28 
Conclusions
SCADA systems are high-value targets where failure has the potential to cause massive amounts of damage. The life cycle of SCADA equipment means that some elements would be considered obsolete by computing standards. Configuration guides are good but will not be effective unless they are easy to understand and inexpensive to implement. Quantitative vulnerability-assessment techniques, although impressive, are of very narrow focus and based upon assumptions. Intrusion-detection work is significantly behind the same efforts in traditional network systems and what is being done is very highly focused on one particular technology. Older PLCs with low computing power make cryptography difficult to implement. Limited network connectivity makes key management difficult as well. 
